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The Second Transjordan attack on Shunet Nimrin and Es Salt, officially known by the British as the Second action of Es Salt 〔Battles Nomenclature Committee 1922 p. 33〕 and by others as the Second Battle of the Jordan,〔Erickson 2001 p. 195〕 was fought east of the Jordan River between 30 April and 4 May 1918 following the failure of the First Transjordan attack on Amman fought at the beginning April, during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of the First World War.〔〔Baly 2003 p. 202〕 During this second attack across the Jordan River, fighting occurred in three main areas. The first area in the Jordan Valley between Jisr ed Damieh and Umm esh Shert the Egyptian Expeditionary Force defended their advanced position against an attack by units of the Seventh Army based in the Nablus region of the Judean Hills. The second area on the eastern edge of the Jordan Valley where the Ottoman Army garrisons at Shunet Nimrin and El Haud, on the main road from Ghoraniyeh to Amman were attacked by the 60th (London) Division many of whom had participated in the First Transjordan attack. The third area of fighting occurred after Es Salt was captured by the light horse brigades to the east of the valley in the hills of Moab, when they were strongly counterattacked by Ottoman forces converging on the town from both Amman and Nablus. The strength of these Ottoman counterattacks forced the EEF mounted and infantry forces to withdraw back to the Jordan Valley where they continued the Occupation of the Jordan Valley during the summer until mid September when the Battle of Megiddo began. In the weeks following the unsuccessful First Transjordan attack on Amman and the First Battle of Amman, German and Ottoman Empire reinforcements strengthened the defences at Shunet Nimrin, while moving their Amman army headquarters moved forward to Es Salt. Just a few weeks later at the end of April, Desert Mounted Corps again supported by the 60th (London) Division were ordered to attack the recently entrenched German and Ottoman garrisons at Shunet Nimrin and advance to Es Salt with a view to capturing Amman. Although Es Salt was captured, the attack failed despite the best efforts of the British infantry's frontal attack on Shunet Nimrin and the determined light horse and mounted rifle defences of the northern flank in the Jordan Valley. However, the mounted yeomanry attack on the rear of Shunet Nimrin failed to develop and the infantry attack from the valley could not dislodge the determined Ottoman defenders at Shunet Nimrin. By the fourth day of battle, the strength and determination of the entrenched German and Ottoman defenders at Shunet Nimrin, combined with the strength of attacks in the valley and from Amman in the hills, threatened the capture of one mounted yeomanry and five light horse brigades in the hills, defending Es Salt and attacking the rear of the Shunet Nimrin position, forcing a retreat back to the Jordan Valley. ==Background== The German and Ottoman forces won victories at the first and second battles of Gaza in March and April 1917. But from the last day of October 1917 to the end of the year, the German, Austrian and Ottoman Empires endured a series of humiliating defeats in the Levant, culminating in the loss of Jerusalem and a large part of southern Palestine to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF). From just north of the Ottoman frontier with Egypt they were defeated at Gaza, at Sheria and at Beersheba, resulting in a retreat to Jaffa and the Judean Hills.〔Keogh 1955 pp. 225–6〕 The Ottoman Army was again forced to retreat, this time from Capture of Jericho by General Edmund Allenby's force in February 1918.〔Falls 1930 Vol. 1 pp. 279–350, 378–9, Vol. 2 Part I pp. 78–291, 302–9, Vol. 2 Part II pp. 650–7〕 In late March and early April, German and Ottoman forces defeated Major Generals John Shea and Edward Chaytor's force at the first Transjordan attack. The Ottoman Fourth Army's VIII Corps' 48th Division with the 3rd and 46th Assault Companies and the German 703rd Infantry Battalion successfully defended Amman against the attack by the Anzac Mounted Division with the 4th (Australian and New Zealand) Battalion Imperial Camel Corps Brigade,〔Falls 1930 Vol. 2 p. 662〕〔(【引用サイトリンク】publisher=Australian War Memorial )〕 reinforced by infantry from the 181st Brigade, 60th (London) Division.〔Falls 1930 Vol. 2 Part I pp. 328-49, Part II, pp. 654–7〕 The objective of the First Transjordan operations had been to disable the Hejaz Railway near Amman by demolishing viaducts and tunnels. As Shea's force moved forward, Shunet Nimrin on the main road from Ghoraniyeh to Es Salt and Amman and the town of Es Salt were captured by the infantry and mounted force. While Es Salt was garrisoned by infantry from the 60th (London) Division, two brigades of Chaytor's Anzac Mounted Division (later reinforced by infantry and artillery) continued on to Amman. The operations had only been partly successful by the time large numbers of German and Ottoman reinforcements forced a withdrawal back to the Jordan. The only territorial gains remaining in the EEF's control were the Jordan River crossings at Ghoraniyeh and Makhadet Hajlah, where pontoon bridges had been built and a bridgehead established on the eastern bank.〔Cutlack 1941, pp. 92, 109〕〔Woodward 2006, p. 163〕〔Blenkinsop 1925, p. 224〕 With their lines of communication seriously threatened by attacks in the Jordan Valley, Shea's and Chaytor's forces withdrew to the Jordan Valley, by 2 April 1918, maintaining the captured bridgeheads.〔Falls 1930 Vol. 2 Part I pp. 345-49〕 On 21 March, Erich Ludendorff launched the Spring Offensive on the Western Front, coinciding with the start of the first Transjordan attack; overnight the Palestine theatre of war went from the British government's first priority to a "side show."〔Woodward 2006 p. 176〕 Because of the threat to Allied armies in Europe, 24 battalions – 60,000 mostly-British soldiers – were sent to Europe as reinforcements. They were replaced by Indian infantry and cavalry from the British Indian Army.〔〔Woodward 2006 pp. 169–70〕〔Blenkinsop 1925, pp. 225–6〕 The large troop movements these withdrawals and reinforcements required caused a substantial reorganisation of the EEF.〔Bou 2009 p. 186〕 Until September, when Allenby's force would be completely reformed and retrained, it would not be in a position to successfully attack both the Transjordan on the right and the Plain of Sharon on the left as well as continuing to hold the centre in the Judean Hills. In the meantime, it seemed essential to occupy the Transjordan to establish closer ties with Britain's important Arab ally, Feisal and the Hejaz Arabs. Until direct contact was made, Allenby could not completely support this force and he knew that if Feisal was defeated, German and Ottoman forces could turn the whole length of the EEF's right flank. This would make their hard-won positions shaky all the way to Jerusalem, and could result in a humiliating withdrawal, possibly to Egypt. Apart from the extremely important military ramifications of such a loss of captured territory, the political fallout could include a negative effect on the Egyptian population, upon whose cooperation the British war effort relied heavily.〔Allenby report to Henry Wilson Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) in Hughes 1999 p. 75〕 Allenby hoped that a series of attacks into the hills of Moab could turn Ottoman attention away from the Plain of Sharon, north of Jaffa on the Mediterranean coast, to the important railway junction at Daraa which, if captured by T.E. Lawrence and Feisal, would seriously dislocate the Ottoman railway and lines of communication in Palestine.〔〔Falls 1930 Vol. 2 p. 365〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Second Transjordan attack on Shunet Nimrin and Es Salt」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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